Fortius Field Notes Fall 2026

The Question Einstein Saved for Last

There is an old joke about Einstein arriving in heaven. St. Peter tells him he will be rooming with three other new arrivals, and introduces the first one: “This gentleman has an IQ of 180.” Einstein is thrilled, and the two of them spend days on relativity and the nature of time.

The second roommate has an IQ of 140, and Einstein happily talks with him about the state of the world, history and politics. Then St. Peter introduces the third: “I’m afraid this fellow’s IQ is about 80.” Einstein thinks for a moment, smiles, and asks, “So, where do you think interest rates are going?”

Cost of capital matters as much as any input in our business. But predicting it is a fool’s errand, and building a deal that only makes money if rates fall or cap rates compress is worse. Underwrite at today’s rate. Find deals with positive leverage today. If your deal needs the Fed to rescue it, you are the roommate with the 80

The Bet Nobody Admitted Making

From 2020 through early 2022, money was nearly free. Rates were not at 50 year lows; by most historical reckonings they were at 5,000 year lows. Syndicators and “fund” managers poured into the business, built beautiful slide decks, and bought multifamily at cap rates in the 3s and low 4s with terminal caps as low as 3%.

Most of those pro formas carried two assumptions that were never labeled as bets. The first was that the loan could be refinanced on similar or better terms. The second was that the exit cap would be no higher than the entry cap. Neither is a business plan. Both are interest rate forecasts dressed up as underwriting.

I understand office investors getting caught. Covid and remote work arrived as a genuine black swan and rewrote the rules of that asset class. Multifamily had no such excuse. The risk was rates, it was visible, and
it was the reason I passed on a long list of deals as both a GP and an LP, including some brought to me by friends and very smart people. Plenty of experienced operators with strong track records got caught anyway.

Case Study: Lake Creek Village Apartments

The clearest local example sits in my own backyard. Lake Creek Village in Edwards is a 270 unit apartment community built in 1993. Eagle County’s housing authority sold it, in a deal that closed in early 2022, to an experienced affordable housing operator for $81.85 million, roughly $303,000 per unit. The listing drew 31 offers, and the county netted about $50 million for new workforce housing (Vail Daily).

The county was right to sell, and I had pushed them to sell it publicly for several years. When the price was announced in December 2021, a wealth management client that was also pursuing the deal with a partner and reached out to get my reaction because the bid was so far above theirs. I told him the buyers were smart guys, but I couldn’t understand how they got they made sense of it.

The deed restriction is the heart of the story. Rents are capped at 75% of area median income in perpetuity, and the cap includes utilities, which the owner pays on master meters. In the year before the sale, utilities alone ran roughly $860,000, close to a fifth of revenue, on a bill that moves with the market while the rent cap moves with a formula.

In place rents averaged about $1,500 against a 75% AMI ceiling of roughly $1,740, so the obvious upside was a one time catch up of about 14% to the cap. After that, rent can grow only as fast as the AMI formula allows, while the owner carries utilities, insurance and payroll at market.

Against trailing net operating income of roughly $2.7 million, the buyer paid an in place cap rate of about 3.3%, and a premium on a per unit basis to recent comparable sales in the region. With acquisition debt in the mid 3% range, the deal had negative leverage on the day it closed.

Public mortgage records indicate the winner financed with roughly $46.3 million of fixed rate debt in the mid 3% range, not floating. In 2024 the property was refinanced through Berkadia with a $48.6 million loan at 6.9%, maturing in April 2029. Annual interest went from roughly $1.6 million to roughly $3.4 million. The pain here is not a floating rate reset. It is a duration mismatch: cheap money that came due long before the asset could grow into its price.

Here is the part every owner waiting on the Fed should sit with. Mountain incomes have risen fast since 2021; CHFA’s own program income limit for Eagle County rose about 13% between January 2024 and January 2026 alone (CHFA 2024; CHFA 2026). The rent cap almost certainly moved up, and NOI with it. It did not save the deal. Roughly $1.7 million a year of additional interest absorbed much of that gain, and any buyer today would price the asset far above a 3.3% cap with the 10 year Treasury above 5%

The Cavalry Isn’t Coming

For three years the industry’s survival plan was to extend, pretend and wait for cuts. That plan just lost its premise. The Fed held at 3.50% to 3.75% through its July meeting, then raised rates in September to 3.75% to 4.00%, and the minutes showed most participants expected another increase by year end.

The long end is what prices real estate, and it has moved further. The 10 year Treasury reached 5.29% by the end of September, while apartment cap rates in August averaged 5.39%, leaving almost no spread for risk. Through most of 2019 to 2021 that spread was roughly 335 basis points (RealPage).

Meanwhile the bill is coming due. The Mortgage Bankers Association estimates about 13% of multifamily mortgage balances mature in 2026, with much of that debt originated when the 10 year was below 2% (CRE Daily). MSCI expects apartment foreclosures to rise in the second half of this year as 60% of the 2021 and 2022 vintage loans mature (Bisnow). Trepp counts $37 billion of hard CMBS maturities this year with no extension option, 39% of them in the fourth quarter (Commercial Observer).

The Fed meets again October 27 and 28. Whatever it does, the argument here does not change: nobody should own a deal whose survival depends on that answer

Talking Distress, Pricing Perfection

Here is what strikes me most. Everyone is talking about distress, and several investors and colleagues have asked whether we should raise a distressed multifamily fund. In the same week, JLL brokers in Denver sent me their newly listed apartment deal at a 5.25% cap rate.

The Denver backdrop does not support that pricing. Metro employment was flat from January 2025 to January 2026 (Denver Gazette), and the office using sector lost about 6,400 jobs in the first eight months of 2026 on top of nearly 5,000 in 2025 (ColoradoBiz). Asking rents were still 3.0% below a year earlier in the second quarter (Northmarq), and operating costs have not gone down with them.

To be fair to the bulls, absorption rebounded strongly this spring and the construction pipeline has shrunk to its lowest level in at least five years (Matthews). Denver may well be near a floor on fundamentals. But the problem with a 5.25% cap is the debt, not the rent roll.

In August, when the 10 year sat at 4.69%, small balance agency loans on ten year terms were pricing from about 6.15% to 7.15%. The 10 year has since moved well above 5%. A buyer at a 5.25% cap is borrowing at roughly 7% to earn 5.25%, which is negative leverage from day one. Every dollar of debt makes the return worse, and the only way out is rent growth or a lower exit cap: the same bet that sank the 2021 vintage. That is my answer on the distressed fund. The distress is real in loan files and special servicing reports, but it has not reached asking prices yet. RealPage describes the current market as a standoff that may not break until maturities, capital pressure or time force sellers to adjust (RealPage). Raising capital early means paying to wait. I would rather be ready than early.

Eagle County: More Doors Are Coming

The same supply glut we have seen in major markets has arrived in many tertiary and rural markets, and that includes Eagle County. I am not going to call out specific properties here, because candidly many of the owners are friends or clients and I don’t want to kick sand in their faces. What I can tell you is that occupancy at many of the newer multifamily properties valley wide are in the 85% range, concessions are on the rise, and my brokerage team estimates another 1,700 to 2,000 doors are either under construction or in the pipeline over the next four years. I am sure landlords will fight to keep those rates up.

Let’s not forget that construction here isn’t cheap, so every one of those models carries very aggressive rent assumptions to make it pencil. Maybe job growth will accelerate and we will get a couple of fantastic snow years. But I think many developers in the mountains went looking for risk free returns and found return free risk instead.

Confluence Townhomes, Edwards, Colorado
Confluence Townhomes, Edwards, Colorado

How We Underwrite

None of this requires a forecast. It requires discipline on a few points:

  • Today’s rate, not tomorrow’s. Every deal is underwritten on debt we can actually get this week. A rate cut is upside, never the plan.
  • Positive leverage on day one. The unlevered yield has to clear the cost of debt at purchase. If borrowing makes the return worse, we pass.
  • No cap rate compression. We assume we sell at a cap rate at or above where we buy.
  • No refinance rescue. The deal has to work if the first loan is the only loan, and the maturity has to fit the business plan with room to spare.
  • Revenue we can defend. We look hard at what can actually move the top line, and we stress the expense lines that have hurt operators most since 2021: insurance, payroll and utilities.

Those rules made us look slow in 2021. They are why we are still here to talk about it.

When the Quacks Duck

There is an old saying among Wall Street salesmen: when the ducks quack, feed them. When investors are hungry for something, you sell them as much of it as they’ll eat. Rick Rule, the contrarian natural resource investor, likes to flip it: when the quacks duck, eat them. Promoters raise money hand over fist when it is flowing. When the cycle turns, patient capital gets to buy what they could not hold.

We are not there yet. The quacks are starting to duck, but sellers are still asking 2022 questions in a 2026 rate market. Our job is to keep our powder dry, keep our underwriting honest, and be ready when the prices finally catch up to the loan files.

And if anyone asks you where rates are going, remember who Einstein saved that question for.

Confluence Townhomes, Edwards, Colorado
Confluence Townhomes, Edwards, Colorado

Mike Pearson
President
Fortius Capital Partners

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